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Abstract
In this study, we develop an open-economy R&D-based growth model with two
intermediate production sectors that use domestic and foreign inputs, respectively.
We nd that strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) has a positive e¤ect on
innovation in the sector that uses domestic inputs but both positive and negative
e¤ects on innovation in the sector that uses foreign inputs. We test and conrm
these theoretical results using an empirical analysis of matching samples that combine
Chinese provincial IPR data with patent database, industrial enterprises database and
customs database of China.
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1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) serve as an important policy tool for stimulating innovation
and economic growth. Seminal studies, such as Nordhaus (1969) and Judd (1985), and
many subsequent studies assume that strengthening IPR stimulates innovation. However,
some recent studies nd that IPR may stie innovation.1 In this study, we use a growth-
theoretic model to show that the e¤ect of IPR on innovation depends on how IPR a¤ects the
spillovers of knowledge. Then, we confront our theory with empirics. Specically, we develop
an open-economy R&D-based growth model with two intermediate production sectors that
use domestic and foreign inputs, respectively. We apply the model to explore the e¤ects of
IPR on knowledge spillovers and innovation. Our results can be summarized as follows. In
the sector that uses domestic inputs, strengthening IPR has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
However, in the sector that uses foreign inputs, strengthening IPR has both positive and
negative e¤ects, where the latter e¤ect is due to IPR suppressing knowledge spillovers from
imports of intermediate inputs.
We test these theoretical results using an empirical analysis of matching samples that
combine Chinese provincial IPR data with patent database, industrial enterprises database
and customs database of China. Our regression results conrm that IPR indeed has the usual
positive relationship with innovation. Furthermore, imports of intermediate inputs also have
a positive relationship with innovation, suggesting that importing rms may experience a
positive e¤ect from imports on innovation. However, strengthening IPR diminishes this e¤ect
from imports on innovation, which is consistent with the above-mentioned suppression e¤ect
of IPR on knowledge spillovers from imports of intermediate inputs.
This study relates to the theoretical literature on innovation and economic growth. The
seminal study in this literature is Romer (1990). Subsequent studies use variants of the R&D-
based growth model to explore the e¤ects of IPR;2 see for example Lai (1998), Li (2001),
Goh and Olivier (2002), Grossman and Lai (2004), Chu (2009a), Furukawa (2010), Chu and
Pan (2013), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Yang (2013), Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014), Cozzi
and Galli (2014), Zeng et al. (2014), Lin (2015), Niwa (2016), Huang et al. (2017) and Saito
(2017). Some of these studies also identify negative e¤ects of IPR on innovation. However,
the current study di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring a novel channel through
which strengthening IPR causes a negative e¤ect on innovation by suppressing knowledge
spillovers from imports of intermediate inputs.
This study also relates to the empirical literature on the determinants of innovation. For
example, Goldberg et al. (2010) use Indian rm-level data whereas Chen et al. (2017) use
Chinese rm-level data to show that imported intermediate inputs increase innovation. Chen
and Puttitanun (2005) consider cross-country panel data whereas Hu and Png (2013) consider
industry-country panel data, and both studies nd that strengthening IPR increases inno-
vation. Recent studies explore channels through which IPR a¤ects innovation. For example,
Ang et al. (2014) show that IPR stimulates innovation by improving rmsexternal nanc-
1See for example Lai (1998), Goh and Olivier (2002), Chu (2009a), Furukawa (2010), Chu and Pan (2013),
Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014), Cozzi and Galli (2014) and Saito (2017) for
theoretical studies and also Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine
(2008) for evidence.
2Chu (2009b) provides a survey of this literature.
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ing ability. Naghavi and Strozzi (2015) nd that IPR interacts with international migration
to encourage domestic innovation by creating an environment that transmits knowledge ac-
quired by emigrants. The current study complements these studies by exploring the e¤ects
of IPR on innovation in China via imports of intermediate inputs.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 discusses the empirical framework. Section 4 shows the regression results and
performs robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. Section 6 contains the data appendix.
2 Theoretical model
We extend the open-economy R&D-based growth model in Grossman and Helpman (1991)
into multiple production and R&D sectors. Also, we assume that one sector uses domestic
inputs to produce di¤erentiated products, whereas the other sector uses foreign inputs. Our
open-economy model can be interpreted as (a) the small-open-economy setting in Grossman
and Helpman (1991) in which the terms of trade are exogenous or (b) a large-open-economy
setting in which the terms of trade are endogenous. In our model, the terms of trade
neither a¤ect the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor nor the equilibrium growth rates of
technologies.
2.1 Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
U =
Z 1
0
e t(lnCy;t +  lnCz;t)dt, (1)
where  > 0 is the discount rate. Cy;t is the consumption of a domestic nal good chosen as
the numeraire.3   0 is a preference parameter on the consumption of a foreign nal good
Cz;t imported from abroad.4 Its price is denoted as pz;t. We assume that on the balanced
growth path, pz;t grows at a constant rate, which can be positive, zero or negative. The
asset-accumulation equation is
_At = rtAt + wtl   Cy;t   pz;tCz;t. (2)
At is the amount of assets. rt is the interest rate.5 l denotes labor. wt is the wage rate. From
standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions are
_Cy;t
Cy;t
= rt   , (3)
Cz;t = Cy;t=pz;t. (4)
3Domestic nal good can be consumed by the household, used to produce intermediate inputs or exported.
4Imported foreign nal good can be consumed by the household or used to produce intermediate inputs.
5Here we assume nancial autarky under which the domestic nancial market is not integrated to the
global nancial market. This assumption is reasonable given capital control in China. Under the assumption
of nancial autarky, it can be shown that the asset-accumulation equation ensures balanced trade.
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2.2 Domestic nal good
Domestic nal good is produced by the following aggregator:6
Yt = (X
d
t )
0:5(Xft )
0:5, (5)
where Xdt is an intermediate good that uses domestic inputs and X
f
t is an intermediate
good that uses foreign inputs. Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand
functions for Xdt and X
f
t :
Xdt =
Yt
2P dt
, (6)
Xft =
Yt
2P ft
, (7)
where P dt and P
f
t are the prices of X
d
t and X
f
t respectively.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Intermediate good i 2 fd; fg is produced by
X it = (L
i
t)
1 
Z nit
0
[xit(!)]
d!, (8)
where Lit denotes domestic production labor and x
i
t(!) denotes domestic or foreign di¤eren-
tiated inputs.7 Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for Lit
and xit(!):
wt = (1  )P itX it=Lit, (9)
pit(!) = P
i
t (L
i
t)
1 [xit(!)]
 1, (10)
where pit(!) is the price of x
i
t(!).
2.4 Domestic di¤erentiated inputs
Di¤erentiated input xdt (!) is produced by domestic nal good with an one-to-one technology.
The prot function is
dt (!) = p
d
t (!)x
d
t (!)  xdt (!) = P dt (Ldt )1 [xdt (!)]   xdt (!). (11)
The monopolistic price is pdt (!) = minf; 1=g, where  2 (1; 1=). As is common in the
literature,8 due to incomplete patent protection , the monopolist cannot charge too high a
price; otherwise, an imitator will produce xdt (!). The amount of prot for ! 2 [0; ndt ] is
dt (!) = (  1)xdt (!) =
  1

P dt X
d
t
ndt
=
  1

Yt
2ndt
 dt , (12)
6Our results are robust to Yt = (Xdt )
(Xft )
1 . For simplicity, we focus on  = 0:5.
7It is useful to note thatXft is produced by combining domestic labor L
f
t and foreign input x
f
t (!) imported
from abroad. So, Xft is not a foreign good but a domestically produced good that uses some foreign inputs.
8See for example Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) and Yang (2013).
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where the second equality uses symmetry in (8), (10) and pdt (!) = . The balanced-growth
value of an invention is
vdt (!) =
dt (!)
r   gd
=
  1

Yt
2ndt
1
+ gdn
 vdt , (13)
where gd and g
d
n are the steady-state growth rates of 
d
t and n
d
t respectively.
2.5 Foreign di¤erentiated inputs
Di¤erentiated input xft (!) is produced by imported foreign nal good with an one-to-one
technology. The prot function is
ft (!) = p
f
t (!)x
f
t (!)  pz;txft (!) = P ft (Lft )1 [xft (!)]   pz;txft (!). (14)
The monopolistic price is pft (!) = min f; 1=g pz;t, where  2 (1; 1=). Once gain, due to
incomplete patent protection , the monopolist cannot charge too high a price; otherwise,
an imitator will produce xft (!). The amount of prot for ! 2 [0; nft ] is
ft (!) = (  1)pz;txft (!) =
  1

P ft X
f
t
nft
=
  1

Yt
2nft
 ft , (15)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (8), (10) and pft (!) = pz;t. The balanced-
growth value of an invention is
vft (!) =
ft (!)
r   gf
=
  1

Yt
2nft
1
+ gfn
 vft , (16)
where gf and g
f
n are the steady-state growth rates of 
f
t and n
f
t respectively.
2.6 R&D for non-importing rms
We refer to rms in the sector that uses only domestic inputs as non-importing rms. The
innovation process for rms in this sector d is
_ndt = k
d
tR
d
t , (17)
where Rdt denotes domestic R&D labor in sector d. The productivity of R
d
t is given by
kdt = n
d
t , which captures knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1990). Free entry yields
_ndt v
d
t = wtR
d
t , ndt vdt = wt. (18)
2.7 R&D for importing rms
We refer to rms in the sector that uses some foreign inputs as importing rms. The
innovation process for rms in this sector f is
_nft = k
f
t R
f
t , (19)
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where Rft denotes domestic R&D labor in sector f . We assume that the productivity of
Rft depends on n
f
t and also the volume of imports. Specically, we consider the follow-
ing specication: kft = n
f
t (1 + 
f
t ), where  > 0 is an import spillover parameter and
 ft  pz;t
R nft
0
xft (!)d!=Yt is the value of imported intermediate inputs as a ratio to output.
This specication is consistent with Grossman and Helpman (1991) who also assume that
knowledge spillovers arise from trade.9 Imposing symmetry and using (7) and (15), one can
show that  ft = =(2) and hence k
f
t = n
f
t + n
f
t =, where   =2 and nft = captures
an additional knowledge spillover e¤ect from imports. In this case, patent protection  re-
duces knowledge spillovers because a larger markup reduces the demand for imports. Thus,
although entrepreneurs are able to appropriate foreign technologies, this foreign knowledge
spillover e¤ect is decreasing in . Free entry yields
_nft v
f
t = wtR
f
t , (1 + =)nft vft = wt. (20)
2.8 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fCz;t; Cy;t; Yt; Xdt ; Xft ; xdt (!); xft (!); Ldt ; Lft ; Rdt ; Rft g1t=0
and a time path of prices fpz;t; rt; wt; P dt ; P ft ; pdt (!); pft (!); vdt ; vft g1t=0. Also, at each instance
of time,
 the representative household chooses fCz;t; Cy;tg to maximize lifetime utility taking
fpz;t; rt; wtg as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt to maximize prot taking fP dt ; P ft g as given;
 competitive rms produce Xdt to maximize prot taking fwt; P dt ; pdt (!)g as given;
 competitive rms produce Xft to maximize prot taking fwt; P ft ; pft (!)g as given;
 a monopolistic rm produces xdt (!) and sets pdt (!) to maximize prot;
 a monopolistic rm produces xft (!) and sets pft (!) to maximize prot taking pz;t as
given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs employ Rdt for R&D to maximize prot taking fwt; vdt g
as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs employ Rft for R&D to maximize prot taking fwt; vft g
as given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that Rdt + Ldt +Rft + Lft = l;
 the trade account is balanced such that Yt Cy;t 
R ndt
0
xdt (!)d! = pz;tCz;t+pz;t
R nft
0
xft (!)d!.
9See Coe and Helpman (1995) for empirical evidence that trade a¤ects international spillovers.
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2.9 Equilibrium labor allocation
The resource constraint on labor in the domestic economy is
Rdt + L
d
t +R
f
t + L
f
t = l. (21)
We dene ldt  Rdt + Ldt and lft  Rft + Lft for convenience. Substituting (6), (9) and (13)
into (18) yields
Ld =
1  


  1(+R
d), (22)
which together with (21) implies that steady-state equilibrium Rd is
Rd = 

  1
  

ld   

1  
  

, (23)
where ld is still endogenous. Substituting (7), (9) and (16) into (20) yields
Lf =
1  


  1


1 + =
+Rf

, (24)
which together with (21) implies that steady-state equilibrium Rf is
Rf = 

  1
  

lf   
1 + =

1  
  

, (25)
where lf is still endogenous.
To solve for ld and lf , we use (6), (7) and (9) to obtain
Lf = Ld, (26)
which together with (22) and (24) implies
lf =

+ 
+ ld. (27)
Combining (21) and (27) yields
ld(
+
) =
1
2

l   
+ 

, (28)
lf (
 
) =
1
2

l +

+ 

, (29)
which show that stronger patent protection  leads to a reallocation of labor from importing
rms in sector f to non-importing rms in sector d because  suppresses knowledge spillovers
from imported inputs in sector f .
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2.10 Equilibrium growth rates of technologies
The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technologies ndt for non-importing rms is
gdn 
_ndt
ndt
= Rd() = 

  1
  

ld(
+
)  

1  
  

, (30)
which is increasing in . Intuitively, stronger patent protection increases prot, which in
turn increases R&D in sector d. Furthermore, this positive e¤ect is strengthened by the
reallocation of resources from importing rms in sector f to non-importing rms in sector
d. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 The growth rate of technologies for non-importing rms in the sector that
uses only domestic inputs is increasing in patent protection .
Proof. Use (30).
The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technologies nft for importing rms is
gfn 
_nft
nft
= (1 + =)Rf () = (1 + =)

  1
  

lf (
 
)  

1  
  

, (31)
which can be increasing or decreasing in patent protection . Intuitively, stronger patent
protection increases prot, which is a positive e¤ect on R&D in sector f . However, stronger
patent protection also has a negative e¤ect on knowledge spillovers and R&D in sector
f . Furthermore, this negative e¤ect is strengthened by the reallocation of resources from
importing rms in sector f to non-importing rms in sector d. Therefore, the overall e¤ect
of patent protection on the growth rate of technologies nft for importing rms in sector f is
ambiguous.10 Proposition 2 summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 The growth rate of technologies for importing rms in the sector that uses
some foreign inputs can be increasing or decreasing in patent protection .
Proof. Use (31).
Finally, taking the di¤erence between the growth rates of nft and n
d
t yields
gn  gfn   gdn = 

  1
  


2

l +

+ 

+

+ 

> 0. (32)
The growth rate of technologies is higher among rms in sector f than rms in sector d due
to the knowledge spillovers from imports in sector f . Proposition 3 summarizes this result.
Proposition 3 The growth rate of technologies is higher for rms in the sector that uses
some foreign inputs than rms in the sector that uses only domestic inputs.
Proof. Use (32).
10See also Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) and Saito (2017), who explore other
channels through which patent breadth has ambiguous e¤ects on innovation.
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Furthermore, it can be shown that gn is rstly increasing and eventually decreasing in
. If we consider  ! 0, then gn is explicitly an inverted-U function in . The intuition
behind this non-monotonicity can be explained as follows. When there is insu¢ cient patent
protection (e.g.,  ! 1), there will be no innovation by rms in the two sectors; in this
case, gn ! 0. Therefore, gn must rst increase given that it is positive. Eventually, the
additional negative e¤ect of  on gfn will reduce the di¤erence between g
f
n and g
d
n causing
gn to fall.
3 Empirical specication and data
In this section, we specify our econometric model and describe the data that we use.
3.1 Empirical specication
Our theory analyzes the e¤ects of IPR, imported intermediate inputs and their interaction
on innovation. Motivated by our theoretical results, we estimate the following logit model:
Pr (yi;t+1 > 0) = 
 
1IPRpt + 2INTit + 3INTit  IPRpt + Zit + p + j + t

(33)
where yit+1 is rm is new products or patent applications in year t+1 to measure innovation
output.11 Explanatory variables include IPRpt, INTit, INTit  IPRpt and other control
variables Zit. IPRpt denotes the log level of IPR in province p of China at time t, INTit is
a dummy variable of whether rm i imports intermediate inputs in year t. If it does, then
INTit = 1; otherwise INTit = 0. Therefore, to be consistent with our theoretical model, we
explore the di¤erent innovation performance of importing rms versus non-importing rms
and how this di¤erence in the innovation performance between the two groups of rms is
a¤ected by IPR. p is the province xed e¤ect. j is the industry xed e¤ect. t is the year
xed e¤ect. "it is the error term.
f1; 2; 3g respectively capture the e¤ects of IPR on innovation, knowledge spillovers
from imports, and the interaction between IPR and imports. First, 1 captures the e¤ect of
IPR on innovation of non-importing rms, which corresponds to Proposition 1. According
to Proposition 1, 1 should be positive indicating that IPR has a positive relationship with
innovation of non-importing rms. Second, 2 captures the impact of knowledge spillovers
from imports, which corresponds to Proposition 3. According to Proposition 3, 2 should
be positive.12 Third, 3 captures the relationship between IPR and knowledge spillovers on
importing rms, which corresponds to Proposition 2. According to Proposition 2, 3 should
be negative indicating that IPR hinders knowledge spillovers from imports.
Other control variables Zit include rms productivity (TFP), capital intensity (capital-
labor ratio), rm size (measured by total employment), rm age, rm export ratio, and
11Because new products and patent applications reect the output of innovation that is subject to delay,
we measure them using data in year t+ 1 instead of year t as suggested by the referee.
12More specically, 2 + 3  IPRpt should be positive. This term provides information on the relative
innovation performance between importing and non-importing rms, which in turn relates to Proposition 3.
Given that 3 < 0 and IPRpt > 0, 2 should be positive and su¢ ciently large. Indeed, this is what we nd
in Section 4.
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state-owned capital share.13 In addition, we also control for the log of population and the
log number of colleges and universities at the provincial level. Finally, we control for the
Herndahl index (HHI) computed at the 4-digit CIC (Chinese Industrial Classication)
industry level. The data appendix provides their summary statistics and data sources.
3.2 Data
To investigate the e¤ects of IPR, imported intermediate inputs and their interaction term
on innovation, we use four databases in China: (1) rm-level production data, (2) rm-
product-level trade data, (3) the State Intellectual Property O¢ ce (SIPO) patent application
data, which contains detailed information on each patent ling, and (4) a provincial-level
measure of IPR protection. The sample period is between 2000 and 2006. With the entry of
China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement, the strengthening of IPR in China during that period has an exogenous nature.
The data source for the rm-level production data is the annual survey of Chinese man-
ufacturing rms, which was maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This
database has been widely used by previous studies; see for example, Cai and Liu (2009)
and Fan, Li and Yeaple (2018) among others. This dataset contains detailed rm-level
information of Chinese manufacturing enterprises and complete information on the three
major accounting statements. Of all the information contained in the NBS database, we are
mostly interested in the variable on new product sale and other control variables, such as
rms productivity.
In order to construct the import dummy variable, we need to merge the NBS database
with the product-level trade data. The rm-product-level trade data, provided by Chinas
General Administration of Customs (CGAC), covers the universe of all Chinese exporters and
importers in 2000-2006. It records detailed information of each trade transaction, including
import and export values, quantities, quantity units, and contact information of the rm.
We match these two databases based on the contact information of rms, because there is
not a consistent coding system of rm identity between them. Our matching procedure is
done in three steps. Our matching procedure is done by company name rst, and next by
both zip code and telephone number, and lastly by telephone number and contact person
name together; see the detailed description of the matching process in Fan, Lai and Li (2015).
Our merged sample covers 42% of total import value reported by the customs database.
The third data source is SIPO. The SIPO dataset contains detailed information on each
patent ling since 1985, including the date of ling, company name and address of the
applicant, name of the patent, and the patent type (i.e., invention, utility model, or design)
according to the Patent Law of China. As Liu and Qiu (2016) mentioned, Chinas patent
ling is a good alternative measure of innovation output. As in Liu and Qiu (2016), we
match rm-level NBS and SIPO data using the company names and then double-check the
matched outcomes using location information of rms.
The fourth data set is a measure of IPR protection in each province, which is calculated
based on information on the level of administrative protection and the level of judicial protec-
13Following Fan, Li and Yeaple (2015, 2018), our TFP measure is estimated based on the augmented
Olley-Pakes method, as in Amiti and Konings (2007). We leave the detail discription of TFP measure in
Appendix B. The results are robust to other di¤erent approaches of estimating TFP.
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tion. We use two indicators to measure the level of the administrative level: (1) the number
of articles on the protection of IPR in the newspapers of provincial authorities divided by
the total number of articles in the newspapers of each province; and (2) one minus the ratio
of annual number of patent disputes to the cumulative number of patent licenses in China
Intellectual Property Rights Yearbook (CIPRY). Also, we use two indicators to measure the
level of provincial intellectual property judicial protection: (1) provincial judicial protection
situation from Fan et al. (2011); and (2) whether the courts take the three-in-one" trial in
intellectual property cases. Appendix A provides the detail description on how we construct
our IPR index based on these four indicators. Finally, we match the measured IPR index
with rm-level NBS data based on the province-year dimension.
4 Regression results
This section reports empirical results on the impact of IPR, imported intermediate inputs
and their interaction term on new products and patent applications to test the theoretical
results.
4.1 Main results
Table 1 shows the main regression results. Results of columns (1) and (2) indicate that
both the import dummy and patent protection are positively associated with innovation,
and the former one is at 1% signicance level whereas the latter is at 10% signicance
level, which are consistent with Chen and Puttitanun (2005), Goldberg et al. (2010), Hu
and Png (2013) and Chen et al. (2017). Column (3) reports the result for the case in
which we control both the import dummy and patent protection, and it shows that both
variables continue to be positively and signicantly correlated with innovation. Next, in
column (4), we include our novel interaction term between patent protection and the import
dummy. Interestingly, we nd that although the import dummy and patent protection are
still positively signicant, their interaction term is signicantly negative. To be more specic,
two ndings emerge. First, the coe¢ cients of the import dummy and patent protection
are still positively signicant. Second, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negatively
signicant at 1% signicance level, which means that compared with non-importing rms,
patent protection has an additional negative e¤ect on the innovation of importing rms. All
these empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
In Table 1, other rm level characteristics such as rms productivity (TFP), capital
intensity (K/L measured by the capital-labor ratio), rm size (Firm Size measured by em-
ployment), rm age (Age), rm export ratio and stated-owned capital share (SOE Share)
are also controlled in the regression. We also control the province and industry level vari-
ables, which are the log of population (Pop) and the log number of colleges and universities
(GGXX ) at the provincial level and the Herndahl index (HHI ) computed at the 4-digit
CIC level. We add year xed e¤ect, industry xed e¤ect and province xed e¤ect in the
regression. All the results are clustered at the province level.
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Table 1: Imports and IPR on new products
(1) (2) (3) (4)
new new new new
Import Dummy X Patent Protection -0.542
(0.149)
Import Dummy 0.209 0.207 1.362
(0.057) (0.057) (0.339)
Patent Protection 0.458 0.455 0.520
(0.235) (0.235) (0.240)
log(TFP ) 0.207 0.217 0.208 0.207
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
log(K=L) 0.208 0.219 0.208 0.207
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
log(Age) 0.146 0.148 0.148 0.148
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
log(Firm Size) 0.536 0.547 0.537 0.537
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
log(Pop) -1.465 -1.867 -1.944 -1.714
(5.614) (5.682) (5.689) (5.636)
log(GGXX) -0.835 -0.909 -0.916 -0.915
(1.076) (1.064) (1.066) (1.060)
Exp Ratio -0.110 -0.069 -0.110 -0.107
(0.110) (0.112) (0.110) (0.109)
SOE Share -0.060 -0.073 -0.061 -0.057
(0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082)
HHI 1.523 1.550 1.530 1.504
(0.160) (0.160) (0.159) (0.161)
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 763586 763586 763586 763586
Probability (mean) of y 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
Notes: The number of the observations in this table is smaller than that of
Table 2, since the data of New product in 2004 are missing. Standard errors
in parentheses. p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01. All the results are clustered
at province level.
4.2 Patent applications
In this section, we consider patent applications instead of new products as the dependent
variable and repeat the main regression estimation of column (4) in Table 1. As shown in
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column (1) of Table 2, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term continues to be negative and
signicant at 5% signicance level. Also, according to the Patent Law of China, patent can
be classied into three categories, namely, invention, utility model, and design.14 Compared
with utility model patents and design patents, invention patents are the most suitable mea-
sure of innovation output. Therefore, it is reasonable to nd that the aforementioned e¤ects
exist in all three types of patents but the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is more signicant
and larger in magnitude for invention patents. In summary, considering the di¤erent types
of patents, our main ndings still hold and are consistent with the theoretical results.
Table 2: Imports and IPR on patent applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
patent invention design utility
Import Dummy X Patent Protection -0.333 -0.447 -0.343 -0.317
(0.161) (0.173) (0.200) (0.159)
Import Dummy 1.185 1.443 1.186 1.193
(0.357) (0.365) (0.451) (0.370)
Patent Protection 0.076 0.059 0.084 0.180
(0.158) (0.220) (0.198) (0.156)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 887490 887490 887490 887490
Probability (mean) of y 0.019 0.010 0.012 0.016
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01. All the results
are clustered at province level. Other control variables include rms productivity, capital
insensity (measured by capital-labor ration), rm size (measured by the number of total
employment), rm age, rm export ratio, and satated-owned capital share. We also
control the provincial and industry level variables, the log total population and the log
number of college and university at the provincial level, and Herndahl index computed
at 4-digit CIC level.
4.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform two more robustness checks. First, we use year-province xed
e¤ects in the regression instead of the province xed e¤ect. Second, we consider the probit
model. We use year-province xed e¤ects to capture time-varying provincial characteristics.
As shown in Table 3, the coe¢ cients of the interaction term from columns (1) to (5) are still
negative and signicant at least at 10% signicance level.
14Detailed description on these three types of inventions can be found in Liu and Qiu (2016).
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Table 3: E¤ects of imports and IPR (within province-year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
new patent invention design utility
Import Dummy X Patent Protection -0.303 -0.384 -0.495 -0.401 -0.375
(0.138) (0.172) (0.185) (0.212) (0.157)
Import Dummy 0.847 1.296 1.549 1.314 1.318
(0.312) (0.377) (0.394) (0.474) (0.363)
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 763586 887490 887490 887490 887490
Probability (mean) of y 0.095 0.019 0.010 0.012 0.016
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01. All the results are
clustered at province level. Other control variables include rms productivity, capital insensity
(measured by capital-labor ration), rm size (measured by the number of total employment),
rm age, rm export ratio, and satated-owned capital share. We also control the provincial and
industry level variables, the log total population and the log number of college and university at
the provincial level, and Herndahl index computed at 4-digit CIC level.
Table 4 reports the empirical results for the probit model. From columns (1) to (5)
in Table 4, the coe¢ cients of the interaction term are still signicantly negative and the
coe¢ cients of the import dummy and patent protection are positive. This means that our
ndings under the logit model are robust to the probit model.
Table 4: E¤ects of imports and IPR (probit model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
new patent invention design utility
Import Dummy X Patent Protection -0.299 -0.151 -0.157 -0.145 -0.144
(0.085) (0.074) (0.074) (0.079) (0.072)
Import Dummy 0.749 0.561 0.548 0.522 0.553
(0.188) (0.165) (0.157) (0.179) (0.170)
Patent Protection 0.250 0.030 0.011 0.032 0.068
(0.122) (0.065) (0.083) (0.075) (0.061)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 763586 887490 887490 887490 887490
Probability (mean) of y 0.095 0.019 0.010 0.012 0.016
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01. All the results are
clustered at province level. Other control variables include rms productivity, capital insensity
(measured by capital-labor ration), rm size (measured by the number of total employment), rm
age, rm export ratio, and satated-owned capital share. We also control the provincial and industry
level variables, the log total population and the log number of college and university at the provincial
level, and Herndahl index computed at 4-digit CIC level.
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5 Conclusion
This study develops an open-economy R&D-based growth model to explore the di¤erent
e¤ects of IPR on the innovation performance of importing and non-importing rms. We test
our theoretical results from the model using an empirical analysis of matching samples that
combine Chinese provincial IPR data with patent database, industrial enterprises database
and customs database of China. In summary, the conditional correlations that we found in
the data are consistent with our theory. However, we acknowledge that these correlations
do not necessarily represent causal relationships and leave this interesting issue to future
research.
6 Data appendix
6.1 Provincial intellectual property rights
For the level of IPR protection in each province, we use information on the level of adminis-
trative protection and the level of judicial protection as follows. First, we use two indicators
to measure the level of the administrative protection. (1) The importance of provincial gov-
ernments emphasis on IPR (IPR1). As in Ang et al. (2014), we use the number of articles
on the protection of IPR in the newspapers of provincial authorities divided by the total
number of articles in the newspapers of each province as a measure of this index. The higher
the index, the more emphasis on the protection of IPR by the provincial government. (2) The
degree of administrative protection of provincial patent o¢ ces (IPR2). As in Wu and Tang
(2016), we use the annual number of patent disputes as a ratio to the cumulative number
of patent licenses in China Intellectual Property Rights Yearbook (2001-2006) to calculate
the administrative protection level of the State Intellectual Property O¢ ce in each of the 31
provinces in China (equal to one minus the ratio of the number of annual patent disputes to
the cumulative number of patents granted).15 A larger value of the indicator is associated
with more e¤ective administrative protection by the provincial patent authority.
Second, we measure the provincial intellectual property judicial protection by two indica-
tors. (1) Provincial judicial protection situation (IPR3). Data on the protection of producer
rights is from Fan et al. (2011). Based on the fairness of law enforcement and the e¢ ciency of
law enforcement agencies, this indicator measures the legal environment in each province in
di¤erent years. (2) Whether the courts take the three-in-one" trial in intellectual property
cases (IPR4). If the courts at all levels in a province have announced the three-in-one" trial
in intellectual property cases in a given year, then the variable is set to 1 for the year and
beyond, otherwise 0. We consider this variable because Chinas intellectual properties are
protected by both administrative protection and judicial protection. Wang and Lv (2016)
consider IPR in Guangdong province and nd that the three-in-one" trial model has a sig-
nicant role in promoting rm innovation by improving the quality and e¢ ciency of trials
in courts.
Ginarte and Park (1997) measure IPR by taking the arithmetic average of IPR sub-
indicators to compute their aggregate index. However, the arithmetic mean may not fully
15Data in 2000 is based on the annual statistical report of the State Intellectual Property O¢ ce.
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reect the di¤erence in the relative importance of the IPR sub-indicators. Wu and Tang
(2016) use principal component analysis to measure the enforcement of IPR in Chinese
provinces. Principal component analysis converts a number of related indicators into a
representative comprehensive indicator by dimensionality reduction. We synthesize two in-
dicators of provincial administrative enforcement and two indicators of provincial judicial
protection to form provincial IPR execution strength.16 Shen (2010) use the method in Gi-
narte and Park (1997) to construct an annual measure of intellectual property rights (IPR5)
at the country level in China. Similar to Hu and Png (2013), we construct the IPR index of
each province by multiplying the provincial IPR execution strength and IPR5.17
6.2 Firm-level productivity
To capture rmsproductivity as a control variable in our regression analysis, we estimate
total factor productivity (TFP). We use a Cobb-Douglas production function as estimation
specication:18
Yft = AftL
l
ftK
k
ft (34)
where production output of rm f at year t, Yft, is a function of labor, Lft, and capital, Kft;
Aft captures rm fs TFP in year t. We use rms value-added to measure production output,
and deate rms inputs (e.g., capital) and value added, using the input price deators
and output price deators from Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012).19 Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) construct the output deators using reference price
information from Chinas Statistical Yearbooks and then calculate the input deators based
on output deators and Chinas national input-output table (2002). The real investment
variable is constructed via the perpetual inventory method. To capture the depreciation
rate, we use each rms real depreciation rate provided by the Chinese NBS rm-level data.
Our TFP measure uses the method of Olley-Pakes (Olley and Pakes, 1996) that has been
augmented to account for additional rm-level decisions. We take into account rms trade
status in the TFP realization, as in Amiti and Konings (2007), by including two trade-status
dummy variablesan export dummy (equal to one for exports and zero otherwise) and an
import dummy (equal to one for imports and zero otherwise). In addition, we include a
WTO dummy (one for a year after 2001 and zero for before) in the Olley-Pakes estimation
to capture the e¤ect of China joining WTO since the WTO accession was a positive demand
shock for Chinas exports. Besides, our results are also robust to alternative measures of
TFP, including the OLS method and the Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer augmented Olley-Pakes
and Levinsohn-Petrin (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) methods (Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer,
2015).
16The weights of IPR1, IPR2, IPR3 and IPR4 are 0.1367, 0.5351, 0.2426 and 0.0856, respectively. We use
the eig function in MATLAB to compute these weights.
17Using the IPR execution strength directly would not a¤ect our results. Data on the provincial IPR index
is available upon request.
18Using a trans-log production function leads to similar estimation results.
19We do not include intermediate inputs (materials). Including intermediate inputs (materials) in the
estimation of TFP does not alter the results of our empirical results.
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6.3 Summary statistics
Table A1 provides the summary statistics of the variables in the empirical analysis.
Table A1: Summary statistics of the key variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
New Product Dummy 763,586 0.095 0.293 0 1
Patent Dummy 887,490 0.019 0.136 0 1
Invention Dummy 887,490 0.009 0.097 0 1
Design Dummy 887,490 0.012 0.107 0 1
Utility Dummy 887,490 0.016 0.125 0 1
Patent Protection 887,490 2.059 0.360 0.568 2.625
Import Dummy 887,490 0.092 0.288 0 1
log(TFP ) 887,490 3.778 1.130 -7.538 11.11
log(K=L) 887,490 3.562 1.320 -6.986 10.46
log(Age) 887,490 2.004 0.898 0 7.602
log(Pop) 887,490 3.950 0.591 0.948 4.576
log(GGXX) 887,490 4.153 0.404 1.099 4.736
log(Firm Size) 887,490 4.854 1.121 0 11.99
Exp Ratio 887,490 0.192 0.357 0 1
SOE Share 887,490 0.211 0.384 0 1
HHI 887,490 0.018 0.033 0.0005 1
Notes: The number of the observations of New Product is smaller since the
data of New product in 2004 are missing.
Table A2: Data sources of the key variables
(1) (2)
Variables Denition Data source
New Product Dummy A dummy variable of new products NBS
Patent Dummy A dummy variable of patent applications SIPO
Invention Dummy A dummy variable of invention patent applications SIPO
Design Dummy A dummy variable of design patent applications SIPO
Utility Dummy A dummy variable of utility-model patent applications SIPO
Patent Protection The log of IPR index From IPR1 to IPR5
IPR1 Governments emphasis on IPR Provincial newspapers
IPR2 Administrative protection of provincial patent o¢ ces CIPRY
IPR3 The protection of producer rights from Fan et al. (2011) Fan et al. (2011)
IPR4 A dummy variable of three-in-onetrials The provincial court
IPR5 Intellectual property legislative protection Shen (2010)
Import Dummy A dummy variable of imports CGAC
log(TFP ) The log of total factor productivity NBS
log(K=L) The log of the capital-labor ratio NBS
log(Age) The log of rm age NBS
log(Pop) The log of population at the provincial level NBS
log(GGXX) The log number of colleges and universities NBS
log(Firm Size) The log of rm-level employment NBS
Exp Ratio The proportion of rm exports in total output NBS
SOE Share Stated-owned capital share NBS
HHI Herndahl index computed at the 4-digit CIC level NBS
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